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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of the newly appointed CEOs on firm’s future investment 
decisions and whether the relation is affected by the equity-based compensation, corporate 
governance provisions and other CEO characteristics.  Using CEO turnover data from 1992-
2004, the results show that new CEOs with high options-based compensation, following forced 
turnover and with shorter organization tenure, are associated with high R&D and advertisement 
investments.  These results are consistent with the managerial incentive effect and the dismissal 
effect.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
odern corporations are characterized by a separation of ownership and control.  This raises the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers.  Shareholders prefer that managers 
provide effort to improve output.  If managers incur a personal cost for providing effort, and that 
managerial effort is not observable by shareholders, then managers have an opportunity to choose actions that 
benefit only themselves.  The alignment of shareholders’ and manager’s interests has become the main task of 
corporate governance.   
 
CEO turnover is an important ingredient of corporate governance.  Prior studies have shown that CEO 
turnover can have a significant positive impact on shareholder wealth and on firm performance (Denis and Denis, 
1995, Huson et al., 2004), and the degree of improvement can be influenced by corporate governance mechanisms 
such as institutional shareholdings, composition of board of directors, market for corporate control (Huson et al., 
2004) and executive compensations (Blackwell et al., 2007).  However, the consequences of CEO turnover on firm’s 
investment decisions have not been fully explored.  Only a few studies have examined the CEO turnover impact on 
firms’ discretionary investments (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993, and Weisbach, 1995).  The current paper provides 
empirical evidence on how CEO turnover relates to firm-level investment decisions and the impact of CEO 
compensation structure, corporate governance provisions (such as the dual leadership and market for corporate 
control), as well as CEO characteristics (such as age and tenure with the firm before becoming CEO) on the relation 
between CEO turnover and firm’s investment decisions.  It adds to a large literature that investigates the impact of 
manager turnover on firms’ outcomes.   
 
The analysis is conducted using both univariate and multivariate analyses.  We examine the change in 
R&D/sales, advertisement/sales, and capital expenditure/sales over various windows; for example, (-1, 1), (-1, 2), 
and (-1, 3) surrounding the event year (the year that firms change CEO).  In addition, since the investments vary 
very much across industries, the industry-adjusted percentage changes in R&D/sales, advertisement/sales, and 
capital investment/sales are examined to provide more precise measures for the new CEOs’ impacts on changes in 
investments.  Following Huson et al. (2004), the multivariate regression is estimated by regressing the change in 
firm’s investment for years (-1, +2) against the new CEO equity-based compensation measures, other corporate 
governance measures, CEO age and tenure, as well as the standard control variables. 
 
 
M 
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The results show that the percentage of options-based compensation as total compensation is an important 
factor that affects the new CEOs’ investment decisions.  Higher percentage of options-based compensation of new 
CEOs leads to higher investment in R&D and advertisement.  In addition, CEOs following forced turnover and 
CEOs with less organization tenure have a higher investment in R&D and advertisement investment, which are 
consistent with the prediction.   
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
There have been extensive studies examining the impact of CEO turnover on firm’s shareholder wealth and 
firm performance (Denis and Denis, 1995; Parrino, 1997; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Fisman, Khurana, 
and Rhodes-Kropf, 2005; Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg, 2005; Blackwell, Dudney, and Farrell, 2007; and 
Dezso, 2007).  However, studies on firms’ discretionary investments following CEO turnover have not been fully 
explored.  Prior studies on the relation between CEO turnover and the firm’s investment mainly focus on the firm’s 
investments near CEO retirement; i.e., the horizon problem (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; 
Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Bushee, 1998; and Cheng, 2004); and these studies have found different results.
1
  
Only a few prior researches study the discretionary investments following CEO turnover problems (Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993,  and Weisbach, 1995).   
 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) examine whether the outgoing CEO’s horizon problem, incoming CEO’s 
big bath behavior, and outgoing CEO’s cover-up problem are due to poor performance or managerial discretion 
using CEO turnover data from 1971–1989 Forbes annual compensation surveys.  First, the authors do not find 
support for the turnover-related horizon problem; i.e., reduce R&D and advertising expenditures as they approach 
retirement.  They find that departing CEOs do not reduce R&D and market-adjusted R&D in their final years (years 
1 and 0).  Instead, incoming CEOs cut R&D in years +1 through +4.  They also find no drop in advertising and 
capital expenditures in year -1, the last full fiscal year of the outgoing CEO.  In addition, after controlling for firm 
performance and endogeneity of CEO turnover using simultaneous equation models, the authors find that the CEO 
turnover dummy variable, which equals to one in year 0 and zero in years -5 to -1, is statistically insignificant 
related to R&D, advertising, and capital expenditures.  This suggests that declines in R&D and advertising prior to 
CEO turnover are driven by poor performance rather than a horizon problem.   
 
Second, by partitioning the sample based on firm performance or routine vs. non-routine turnovers (using 
CEO retirement age) or both criteria, the authors find that market-adjusted R&D and advertising are not significantly 
different in years -1 to +5 compared to years -5 to -2 for good performers, while they are significantly negative for 
poor performers.  Capital expenditures are found to be significantly higher for good performers in year +1, but 
significantly lower for poor performers.  These findings are inconsistent with the horizon problem predictions that 
routinely departing CEOs reduce R&D and advertising expenditures more as they approach retirement since it is 
anticipated by the CEO in advance.     
 
Third, the authors find that market-adjusted accounting accruals are significantly negative in year 0 for 
non-routine, poor performers, but not for routine, good performers, which is consistent with the big bath prediction 
that income-reducing accruals should be larger for poor performers.  However, the findings that accruals in year +1 
remain negative, which shows no rebound and that R&D and advertising are significantly negative in year 0 for non-
routine, poor performers but not for routine, good performers, which are inconsistent with big bath predictions.   
 
Fourth, CEO cover-up problems predict that outgoing CEOs select income-increasing accruals as 
performance deteriorates.  However, the authors find that accounting accruals for poor performers are income-
reducing rather than income-increasing in year 0.  In addition, although accruals are higher in years -5 to -2 for poor 
performers than good performers, accruals are not significantly higher in years -5 to -2 for non-routine than routine 
CEO turnover.  The findings do not consistently support the outgoing CEO cover-up problem.      
                                                 
1 Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that CEOs spend less on R&D during their final years.  On the other hand, Gibbons and Murphy 
(1992) find that R&D investments are largest in CEOs’ last year of office.  Cheng (2004) finds that horizon has no impact on 
R&D investment.  
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Weisbach (1995) examines whether CEO changes within the acquiring firm are related to the probability 
that the acquirer will sell the acquisition using a sample of 270 acquisitions by 200 separate acquirers made between 
1971 and 1982 that are divested during 1978-1989.  The author finds that CEO changes tend to increase the 
divestiture probabilities of poorly performing acquisitions only, while the probability of divesting a successful 
acquisition actually decreases with a CEO change.  The impact of a CEO change on the probability of divesting an 
unprofitable acquisition significantly increases regardless of the window used.  In addition, both normal and forced 
turnover increase divestitures of poorly-performing acquisition, which suggests that it is not poor performance that 
determines both turnover and divestiture.  The results also do not support that outsider and insider CEOs have any 
differences in making divestiture decisions.  In conclusion, the author suggests that management changes are 
important events for corporations because they lead to reversals of poor prior decisions for both forced and normal 
turnovers. 
 
Although there are only limited researches on managerial discretionary investment after CEO turnover, 
there have been extensive studies on firm’s shareholder wealth and firm performance following CEO turnover.  
Studies have shown that the degree of improvement in performance following CEO turnover is influenced by 
executive compensations and other corporate governance mechanisms (Denis and Denis, 1995; Parrino, 1997; 
Huson et al., 2004; Fisman et al., 2005; Clayton et al., 2005; and Dezso, 2007).  Denis and Denis (1995) examine 
the effectiveness of boards of directors in removing poorly-performing CEOs using 908 non-takeover-related top-
management changes (CEO, chairperson, and president) announced in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) between 1985 
and 1988.  They find that forced turnovers are preceded by significantly large declines in operating performance and 
followed by large improvements in performance.  On the other hand, normal retirements do not exhibit performance 
declines prior to the management changes, but do exhibit small performance improvements following the changes.  
The findings that forced turnovers are followed by large improvement in performance and are consistent with the 
effective board monitoring of top management.  However, they find the forced turnovers are rare and are due more 
often to large block holders, other shareholders, creditors, and potential acquirers than to normal board monitoring.  
The findings suggest that boards of directors may not function effectively in isolation.  
 
Huson et al. (2004) examine the CEO turnover and firm performance using new CEOs listed in the Forbes 
annual compensation surveys for the 1971-1995 period.  They find that in addition to industry-adjusted operating 
rate of return on total assets (OROA), the control group-adjusted OROA increases following CEO turnover.  The 
control group-adjusted OROA is calculated by subtracting median OROA for a control group matched by two-digit 
industry and by prior OROA performance, which controls mean-reversion of industry and firm-specific factors.  The 
result implies the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms in removing poorly-performing executives and 
selecting new CEOs.  In addition, simple pair-wise comparisons suggest that board composition, institutional 
shareholdings, takeover pressure, and outside successor CEOs positively affect performance change.  Further 
analysis using multivariate regression analysis shows that among these variables, institutional shareholdings are 
positively related to performance change and the outsider-dominated board is positively related to performance 
change for the sub-period 1988-1994.   
 
Most recently, using 125 new CEOs listed in the Forbes annual compensation surveys between 1982 and 
1991, Blackwell et al. (2007) examine the compensation package of newly appointed CEOs and the changes in 
compensation structure following CEO turnover and their impact on future performance.  The authors find that new 
CEOs obtain significantly higher percentage of total compensation from equity-based compensation, including both 
new options grants and new stock grants, for both voluntary and forced turnover and for different ages of the 
incoming and outgoing CEO.  CEO’s total compensation is proxied as the sum of the salary and bonus, value of 
options granted, and the value of new stock grants.   
 
The results from regressions of future performance on percentage of new stock grants and percentage of 
options granted after controlling for firm size, CEO’s total stockholdings, asset in place, financial leverage, business 
risk, CEO age, and forced or voluntary turnover dummy show that new stock grants, as a percentage of total 
compensation, are positively related to future performance for both voluntary and forced turnover.  Firm’s future 
performance is measured as unadjusted and industry-adjusted operating income before depreciation and unadjusted 
and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in years t+2 and t+3.  The percentage of new option grants is found to be positively 
related to future operating income for the forced turnover subsample.  In addition, the authors regress changes in 
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firm performance from t-1 to the average of t+1 and t+2 on changes in the restricted stock granted and options 
granted as a percentage of total compensation from the outgoing CEO to incoming CEO, after controlling for the 
change in total stockholdings from outgoing CEO to incoming CEO, change in assets-in-place, change in long-term 
debt to assets, and change in firm size.  The results show that the change in new stock grants is positively related to 
changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted operating income for the full sample, voluntary turnover sample, and 
inside replacement sample.  In summary, the results suggest that greater new stock grants are associated with 
improved operating performance after turnover, especially following voluntary turnover.   
 
The above studies have examined the consequences of CEO turnover as well as the impact of corporate 
governance and CEO compensation structure on firm’s future performance.  However, the consequences of CEO 
turnover on firm’s investment decisions have not been fully explored.     
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interests has been the main task of corporate governance.  
One of the most important internal monitoring mechanisms is the decision of the board of directors to replace 
poorly-performing CEO.  Prior research has examined three hypotheses on CEO turnover’s effect on financial 
performance - the scapegoat hypothesis, the improved management hypothesis, and the earnings management 
hypothesis (see Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Huson et al., 2004; and Clayton et al., 2005).  These hypotheses are 
extended to the firm’s discretionary investments.  First, the scapegoat hypothesis assumes that all managers have the 
same ability and that the availability of manager pool can serve as a credible threat to ensure optimal exertion of 
effort by the incumbent CEO.  The poor financial performance is due to chance and the CEO appears to be a 
“scapegoat”.  Khanna and Poulsen (1995) find that managers of Chapter 11 firms and the control firms matched by 
industry and size make very similar decisions and that, on average, neither set of managers is perceived to be taking 
value-reducing action, suggesting that when managers are blamed for financial distress, they are only the scapegoat.  
Since managers have the same quality, CEO turnover does not affect the firm’s future performance and strategy.  
The scapegoat hypothesis predicts that there is no change in investments from the prior CEO after controlling for 
other effect.   
 
The improved management hypothesis suggests that managers possess different abilities and management 
styles because of different career paths and personal backgrounds, and a board selects a specific CEO to match the 
firm’s expected strategy.  The hypothesis predicts that CEO turnover will impact the firm’s future performance and 
strategies.  Weisbach (1995) finds that management changes increase the divestiture probabilities of poorly-
performing acquisitions for both forced and normal turnovers.  Denis and Denis (1995) find that forced turnovers are 
followed by large improvement in operating, although forced turnovers are rare and are due more often to large 
block holders, other shareholders, creditors, and potential acquirers than to normal board monitoring.  In a recent 
paper, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that individual managers do matter in the determination of firm policy, 
including capital expenditure, acquisition, R&D, advertisement, leverage, SG&A, dividend, ROA, and operating 
cash flows using data from 1992-1999.   The improvement hypothesis suggests that there will be changes in long-
term investments after CEO turnover.  In addition, following Clayton et al. (2005), an outsider new CEO is chosen 
in order to initiate a change in corporate strategy.  Therefore, larger changes in R&D, advertisement, and capital 
expenditures are expected to follow the appointment of outsider CEOs than insider CEOs. 
 
The earnings management hypothesis argues that managers have discretion over the firm’s strategy and that 
they may manipulate long-term investments to accrue benefits for themselves only.  Prior research has examined 
incoming CEOs’ taking a big bath behavior; i.e., they prefer to reduce earnings in the year of change to blame the 
predecessor and to establish a lower benchmark for subsequent performance evaluation.  Pourciau (1993) argues that 
to manage expectations and set achievable performance goals, the new CEO has strong incentives to engage in 
initial income-reducing earnings management with subsequent income-increasing earnings management.  Murphy 
and Zimmerman (1993) argue that the big bath behavior is more likely to occur if the outgoing CEO is forced out 
because it is more credible to blame the predecessor under these situations.  They find that accounting accruals are 
significantly negative in the transition year for non-routine, inferior departing CEOs, which partially supports the big 
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bath hypothesis.
2
  However, they did not find the rebound of the accruals in the following year.  Lasalle, Jones, and 
Jain (1993), on the other hand, find that firms with changes in CEOs are more likely to make both income-
decreasing and income-increasing changes than firms without such change in CEOs.  This suggests that new CEOs 
are not adopting income-decreasing accounting early in their tenure.   
 
Long-term investments, such as capital expenditure, R&D, and advertisement, have similar features that the 
benefits from current investment are not fully realized until many years following the investment.  However, 
managers may have different incentives to invest in different types of long-term investments because of the 
differences in accounting treatment.  Capital expenditures for long-lived assets are long-term investments that are 
capitalized as assets and expensed gradually over time.  The revenues and expenses related to capital expenditure are 
spread over the life of the underlying assets.  On the other hand, unlike long-term capital expenditures, U.S. GAAP 
requires that firms uniformly expense R&D expenditures, acquired in-progress R&D, and advertising costs when 
incurred.  This treatment is based on the presumption that the future economic benefits created by R&D and 
advertising are too uncertain to justify asset recognition.  In addition, R&D investments have a longer horizon than 
do advertising expenditures.  Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) conclude that the life of advertising is one to five 
years, while the life of R&D is 5-10 years.  This suggests that the benefit from investment in R&D has a longer 
period than advertising costs before it is realized.  Therefore, if the incoming CEOs take a big bath, they will make 
higher long-term investments in their first year of office to reduce income and make lower long-term investments to 
increase earnings in the following year.  In addition, because of the different treatment in R&D, advertising, and 
capital investments, they will make higher investments in R&D and advertising than in capital expenditures.  
Furthermore, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) argue that forced CEO turnovers will have higher income-reducing 
activity than normal turnovers since, in these situations, it is more credible for the new CEO to “blame” the old CEO 
for a poor situation.   
 
Based on the above arguments, the hypotheses are stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO will not affect the firm’s discretionary investment. 
 
Hypothesis 2:   Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO will change (increase or decrease) the firm’s discretionary 
investments. 
 
Hypothesis 3:   Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO will increase the firm’s discretionary investments in the 
first year of office and decrease the firm’s discretionary investments in later years.  Further, a 
newly appointed CEO will increase the firm’s R&D and advertising investments more than capital 
expenditure investment in the first year of office. 
 
In addition, the following hypotheses are stated when incoming CEOs are outsiders and when outgoing 
CEOs are forced. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed outsider CEO will make a larger change (increase or decrease) 
in the firm’s discretionary investments than an insider CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO following a forced turnover will increase discretionary 
investments more than a normal turnover in the first year of office. 
 
The agency theory argues that managerial discretion problems can be reduced if managerial incentive 
compensation or other corporate governance mechanisms are used to effectively induce and monitor the manager’s 
behavior.  Equity-based compensation can be used to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests so that managers 
can act for the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  More recently, studies have shown that 
options and stock ownership provide different incentives to CEOs in terms of riskiness of long-term investment.  
Stock ownership forces managers to bear both upside and downside risk, while options-based compensation 
                                                 
2 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) did not find an increase in long-term investment, such as R&D and advertising, as an income-
reducing technique.  On the other hand, they find that newly appointed CEOs invest less in R&D and advertising investments. 
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provides CEOs with protection from downside risk.  The option pricing theory indicates that the option value 
increases with the volatility of the underlying stock.  Therefore, the use of stock options can lead managers to select 
more risky projects.  Prior studies argue that capital expenditure, R&D, and advertising are different in terms of 
riskiness, and R&D and advertising are more risky than capital expenditures (Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002;  
Shi, 2003; and Ghosh, Moon, and Tandon, 2007).  This implies that stock-based compensation will increase 
investment in capital expenditures and options-based compensation will increase long-term R&D and advertising 
investments.  The empirical results are mixed.  For example, studies have shown that stock-based compensation 
increases R&D (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; and Ghosh et al., 2007) decreases 
R&D (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002); unrelated to R&D (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007); increases long-term capital 
expenditure (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; Kang, Kumar, and Lee, 2006); and unrelated to capital expenditure 
(Coles et al., 2006; Ghosh et al., 2007).  Prior research also finds that options-based compensation increases R&D 
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Ghosh et al., 2007; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007); decreases R&D 
(Defusco, Zorn, and Johnson, 1991); increases long-term capital expenditure (Larcker, 1983; Sanders and Hambrick, 
2007; decreases capital expenditure (Coles et al., 2006); and unrelated to capital expenditure (Defusco et al., 1991; 
Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Eng and Shackell, 2001; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Ghosh et al., 2007).   
 
Based on the above argument, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO with stock-based compensation will increase the firm’s 
investment in capital expenditures. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  Ceteris paribus, a newly appointed CEO with options-based compensation will increase the firm’s 
investment in R&D and advertising. 
 
In addition to the incentive provided by equity-based compensation, prior research has argued that other 
corporate governance mechanisms can be used to control managerial opportunistic behavior.  However, the 
empirical results are mixed.  Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter, and Poulsen (1990) find that the 
implementation of anti-takeover provisions decreases the R&D investments; Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003) find 
that anti-takeover provisions increases capital investments; and Richardson (2006) finds that anti-takeover increases 
over-investment.  Further, Huson et al. (2004) argue that better monitoring can lead to the appointment of a superior 
CEO, which leads to larger changes in investments.  On the other hand, better monitoring can result in more rapid 
and accurate assessment of an incumbent CEO, which leads to small changes in investments.  Therefore, the 
prediction of corporate governance impact on the behavior of newly appointed CEO is ambiguous.  The hypothesis, 
stated in null form, is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 8:  Ceteris paribus, better corporate governance is not associated with the investments behavior of the 
newly appointed CEO. 
 
SAMPLE, MODEL SPECIFICATION, AND VARIABLES  
 
Sample 
 
The initial sample is identified using Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database for the period 1992-2004.  
We use “BECAMECE” and “LEFTOFC” provided by Execucomp to identify CEOs of firms. Besides 
“BECAMECE”, Execucomp provides “CEOANN” flag to identify the individual who was CEO for the majority of 
the fiscal year. When the “BECAMECE” is missing and the compensation data is available, we use “CEOANN” and 
DEF 14A from EDGAR on SEC’s website to determine the CEOs.3  We then identify the new CEOs when there is a 
different CEO in year t than in year t-1.  This process yields 2,326 new CEO observations for the period 1992-2004.  
We exclude interim CEOs and new CEOs resigned after one-year in office because future investment measures are 
not available during their tenures.  This process eliminates 238 observations.  Further, new CEOs due to spin-off are 
excluded.   In addition, we eliminate the financial and utility industry firms because they have different investment 
policies. 
                                                 
3 For example, firms sometimes do not have CEO title, which is taken to be the chairperson or president based on “CEOANN” 
and DEF 14A from EDGAR on SEC’s website to determine the CEOs.   
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Using CEO names provided by Execucomp, we collect the incoming CEO’s organization tenure, voluntary 
or forced turnover, CEO age from LexisNexis, company proxy statement, press release, and web pages.  Outgoing 
CEOs are classified as FORCED if they are fired, ousted, terminated, or resigned due to loss of operations.  If the 
CEO leaves to join another firm, if they die, or if they departed to pursue personal or other interests, the turnovers 
are classified as voluntary.  
 
Following Huson et al. (2004), we define OUTSIDER CEO as new CEOs that have worked for the 
company for one year or less when they are appointed.  Otherwise, they are considered INSIDER.  In addition, some 
new CEOs initially join the firm as COO or president and are promoted as CEO after one year.  Although these new 
CEOs are INSIDER, their behavior is different than new INSIDER CEOs that have been with the firm for longer 
years.  Therefore, another variable, CEO organization tenure, is defined as subtracting the year that new CEOs join 
the firm from the year they become CEOs.   
 
The above data is merged with the Compustat database.  We exclude firms that have zero capital 
expenditure, R&D, and advertising, respectively, for each test.  The final sample is 1,705, 1,167, and 483 firm-year 
observations for capital expenditure, R&D, and advertising, respectively. 
 
Model Specification and Variable Measurements  
 
The main question of the current paper is to examine whether equity-based compensation of newly 
appointed CEOs affect firms’ future investment decisions and whether the relation is affected by the corporate 
governance provisions and other CEO characteristics.  Empirically, we first use the univariate analysis to test 
hypotheses 1 to 3 and use multivariate regressions to test hypotheses 4 to 8.  Following Huson et al. (2004), the 
regression model is as follows: 
 
Change in investments (-1, +2) = a0 + α1 Forced + α2 Outsider + α3HISTK + α4 HIOPT + α5 CEO DUALITY + α6 
CONTROLS + error t  
 
where CONTROLS is a vector of variables that are expected to influence the investments.  By including the control 
variables, the effects of the interested variables on change in investments are isolated. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is measured using observable managerial investment decisions; i.e., capital 
expenditure, R&D, and advertising costs.  We examine the change in the above investments over the period from 
one year before to two years after the year of CEO turnover (-1, +2).  Investment intensities are measured as 
R&D/sales, advertising/sales, and capital expenditure/sales.  We measure industry investments as the median value 
of corresponding measures for the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for firms available 
from the Compustat database.   
 
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables include OUTSIDER, FORCED, equity-based compensation, and corporate 
governance variables.  OUTSIDER and FORCED variable are defined previously.   The equity-based compensation 
measures are HISTK and HIOPT.  HISTK equals one if CEO stock ownership is greater than the median of the 
samples and 0 otherwise.  HIOPT equals one if options-based compensation is greater than the median of the 
samples (without change for subsamples) and 0 otherwise.  The options-based compensation is calculated based on 
previous year CEO’s value of unexercised exercisable options and unexercised unexercisable options and value of 
stock options grants as a percent of the total compensation.   This is to say that for the event window (-1, 1), the 
CEO’s options-based compensation is calculated for year zero; but for the event windows (-1, 2) and (-1, 3), the 
options-based compensation is calculated for year 1 and year 2, respectively.  The corporate governance variable is 
measured as CEO dual leadership (CEO Duality).  Prior research argues that when the CEO is the chair of the board 
of directors, the agency problem is greater since decision-making and the monitoring of decisions is performed by 
the same individual (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002).  CEO dual leadership is obtained from the Execucomp database. 
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Control Variables 
 
The control variables are derived from previous studies studying the determinants of firm’s investments, 
such as Ryan and Wiggins (2002), Coles et al. (2006), and Ghosh et al. (2007). 
 
Investment Opportunity Sets 
 
In a perfect world, with frictionless capital markets, according to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
proposition, a firm’s investment should depend only on the profitability of its investment opportunity sets.4  Firms 
with higher investment opportunities undertake higher levels of risky investments to maintain their future growth.  
Ryan and Wiggins (2002) find that investment opportunity set is positively related to firm’s R&D investment.  Coles 
et al. (2006) find that investment opportunity set is positive related to both R&D and capital expenditures.  
Therefore, we expect a positive association between investment opportunity set and capital expenditure, R&D and 
advertising investments.  The investment opportunity set is measured as Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ), which is defined as 
the ratio of market value of the firm’s securities to replacement cost of its tangible assets; i.e., the market value of 
the firm’s equity plus the liquidating value of preferred stock, plus the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total assets.   
 
Firm Size 
 
Holmstrom (1989) argues that small firms are more innovative because of their simpler task structure and 
different attitude toward risk as compared with larger firms.  Clinch (1991) documents that firm size and R&D are 
negatively related.  Coles et al. (2006) find that firm size has a significant negative impact on R&D and capital 
expenditures.  Based on the results in the previous research, we expect a negative relation between firm size and 
capital expenditure, R&D and advertising investments.  The logarithm of a firm’s market value at the fiscal year-end 
is used to control for the firm size (SIZE). 
 
Surplus Cash 
 
 Surplus cash is related to the firm’s financial constraints and liquidity.  A large literature examines the 
influence of financial constraints on investment, such as Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Scharfstein (1991), and Petersen and Rajan (1994).  They find that cash flows and liquidity measures are 
strongly related to investment.  Coles et al. (2006) find that surplus cash is significantly positively related to R&D 
investment.  Following prior findings, we expect that the firm’s investments are positively related to surplus cash.  
Surplus cash is defined as cash flow from operations minus capital expenditures, scaled by the current assets.   
 
Industry Investment Change 
 
 Bushee (1998) argues that industry R&D investment intensity captures the investment opportunity set 
within the firm’s industry and the firm’s investment spending needed to stay competitive within the industry.  He 
finds that industry investment has a positive effect on the firm’s R&D investment.  We expect that individual firm 
investment and industry investment are positively related. 
 
CEO Age 
 
Prior research suggests that older CEOs are more conservative and reluctant to change (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003, and Barker and Mueller, 2002).  Younger CEOs, on the other hand, are more risk-seeking and prefer 
to change.  The empirical findings are mixed.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEO age is negatively related to 
capital investment and insignificantly related to R&D investment.    Ryan and Wiggins (2002) find that CEO age is 
positively related to R&D investment.  Based on the previous studies, we expect an ambiguous relation between 
CEO age (AGE) and the firms’ investments.  
                                                 
4 The Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumption is violated by the existence of taxes and transaction costs, as well as the 
informational asymmetries and agency problems.  See Stein (2003) for more discussion and empirical evidence of the violation 
of the Modigliani–Miller theorem. 
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Incoming CEO Organization Tenure 
 
 Prior research argues that longer tenure with the firm before becoming CEO is negatively related to the 
extent of the strategic changes in the firms (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990).  We expect that CEO organization 
tenure is negatively related to changes in capital expenditure, R&D, and advertising expense. 
 
Year Dummies 
 
To the extent that there may exist other correlated omitted variables, following Coles et al. (2006), we 
include year dummies as control variables to account for unobservable aspects of the firms’ investments or 
contracting environments that may co-vary with years.   
 
Table 1 provides the variable definitions, data generalization method and the expected sign on investments. 
 
Table 1:  Data Description, Source, and Expected Sign on Investment 
Variable Data Generalization Methods Expected Sign 
R&D intensity (RDINT), Advertising 
intensity (ADINT), and Capital 
expenditure intensity (CAPINT) 
RDINT = R&D investment/Sales*100 
ADINT = Advertising /Sales*100 
CAPINT = Capital expenditure/sales*100 
 
Change in R&D (DRD), advertising 
(DAD), and capital expenditure (DK) 
DRD = (R&D investment t+2 - R&D investment t-1)/ R&D 
investment t-1*100,  
DAD = (Advertisingt+2-Advertisingt-1) /Advertisingt-1 *100, 
and  
DK = (Capital investt+2-capital investt-1) / capital investt-1*100 
 
Industry R&D intensity (INDRD), 
Advertisement intensity (INDAD) and 
Capital expenditure intensity (INDK) 
INDRD = median (RDINT) for all sample firms in the same 
two-digit SIC code for the same sample year 
INDAD = median (ADINT) for all sample firms in the same 
two-digit SIC code for the same sample year 
INDK = median (CAPINT) for all sample firms in the same 
two-digit SIC code for the same sample year 
(+) 
SIZE: Market value (LOGMKTVAL) LOGMKTVAL=log (The close price for the fiscal year*the 
company’s common shares outstanding) 
- 
Tobin’s average Q (TOBINQ) TOBINQ=(market value of equity + liquidating value of 
preferred stock + total long term debt + debt in current 
liabilities)/total assets  
 
(+) 
Free cash flow (FCF) FCF=(net operating cash flow – capital expenditure)/total 
assets  
 
R&D & AD: (+/-)  
Capital: (+) 
Cash compensation as a percentage of 
total compensation  
(salary + bonus)/total compensation.  Obtained from 
ExecuComp. 
R&D/AD: (-) 
Capital: (+) 
Options-based compensation as a 
percentage of total compensation  
(Value of unexercised exercisable options + value of 
unexercised unexercisable options) / total compensation.  
Obtained from ExecuComp 
 
R&D/AD: (+) 
Capital: (+/-)  
CEO stock ownership (SHROWNPC) CEO’s percentage of stock ownership.  Obtained from 
ExecuComp. 
R&D/AD: (-) 
Capital: (+) 
Interlock relationship (INTLOC) INTLOC is a dummy variable that equals to 0 if false and 1 if 
true.  Obtained from ExecuComp. 
R&D/AD: (+/-) 
Capital: (+/-) 
CEO’s age (AGE) Obtained from ExecuComp and supplemented with proxy 
statement. 
R&D/AD: (+/-) 
Capital: (+/-) 
CEO’s organization tenure  Current fiscal year minus the year that CEO joins the 
company.   
R&D/AD: (-) 
Capital: (-) 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables.  The median (mean) capital expenditure, R&D, 
and advertising, as a percentage of sales, are 4% (9%), 3% (12%), 2% (4%).  Total cash compensation (cash plus 
bonus) for CEOs is about 31% (39%) of the total compensation and the median (mean) options-based compensation 
(Black-Scholes value of current stock options granted) is about 47% (46%) of their total compensation during the 
sample period (1992-2004).  The median (mean) value of CEOs’ total holdings of the unexercised stock options is 
about 30 (128) times of total compensation.  The median (mean) stock ownerships of CEOs are about 0.10% 
(1.08%).  The CEO’s age and organization tenure range from 28 to 79, and 0 to 49, respectively.  The median of age 
and organization tenure are about 52 and 5 years.  CEO age is younger than CEO median age of 56, as reported in 
Execucomp, because the sample includes new CEOs only.   
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Sample Data from 1992-2004 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Capital investment as a percentage of sales 9% 4% 18% 2% 8% 
R&D as a percentage of sales 12% 3% 45% 1% 10% 
Advertisement as a percentage of sales 4% 2% 7% 1% 5% 
Tobin’s Q 1.76 1.26 1.73 0.88 1.98 
Firm size: log of market value 6.93 6.84 1.79 5.76 8.06 
Free cash flow 0.02 0.04 0.19 (0.02) 0.09 
Salary 437 390 294 250 573 
Bonus 445 229 758 26 537 
Restricted stock granted 688 - 2,647 - 200 
Stock options granted (black-scholes values) 3,256 1,004 9,738 193 2,902 
Total compensation (TDC+ other annual +restricted stock grants 
+ LTIP + all other + value realized from options exercised + 
value of stock options granted) 5,093 2,272 10,967 1,020 4,878 
Value of stock options held (Value of unexercised exercisable 
options + Value of unexercised unexercisable options) 5,170 653 28,726 3 3,271 
Total cash compensation as a percentage of total compensation 39 31 30 15 58 
Black-Scholes value of current stock options granted as a 
percentage of total compensation 46 47 31 19 73 
Value of stock options held as a percentage of total  
compensation 128 30 404 1 110 
CEO’s stock ownership  1.075 0.099 5.191 0.022 0.333 
CEO’s age 51 52 7 46 56 
CEO’s organization tenure 9 5 11 - 16 
Force turnover 0.38 - 0.49 - 1.00 
 Interlock relationship  0.04 - 0.21 - - 
 CEO dual leadership  0.31 - 0.46 - 1.00 
Note: Compensation data are obtained from Compustat ExecuComp and financial data are from Compustat Industrial Annual.  
CEO age, organization tenure and forced turnover are obtained from firms’ proxy statement and financial press.  The descriptions 
and sources of data are presented in Table 1.   
 
Figure 1 provides the median unadjusted and industry-adjusted capital expenditures, R&D, and advertising 
as a percentage of sales around the CEO’s turnover events.  It shows that the median of industry-adjusted capital 
expenditure and advertisement are the lowest for the turnover year compared to those before and after turnover.  
Since there are increases in capital expenditure and advertising investments during year (0, +1), it is inconsistent 
with the scapegoat hypothesis.  The figure shows that median industry-adjusted advertising is increasing over the 
time from (0, +3) and median industry-adjusted R&D is not different from zero at all times.  This suggests that 
managers are not taking big bath behavior.  The decrease in median industry-adjusted capital expenditure in year 
(+2, +3) is consistent with the big bath hypothesis for capital expenditure.  However, the results do not support that 
the CEO will increase the firm’s R&D and advertising investments more than capital expenditure in the first year of 
office.   
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Figure 1:  Median Unadjusted and Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditure, R&D, And Advertising Around CEO 
Turnover Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C provide the results for the median and mean tests for OUTSIDER, 
FORCED, HIOPT and HISTK.  The results show that OUTSIDER CEOs invest less in R&D and advertising 
investment, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.  In addition, CEOs following FORCED turnover invest more in 
R&D and advertising investments, but less in capital expenditures compared to CEOs following voluntary turnover.  
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 5 in terms of R&D and advertising investments.  Table 3 also shows 
that new CEOs with high options-based compensation invest more in R&D and advertising investments than low
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Table 3:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO Investment Behavior 
 
Panel A:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO R&D Investment Behavior 
  OUTSIDER vs. INSIDER FORCED vs. Voluntary 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
Insider Outsider 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Insider Outsider 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 12.718 12.037 0.461 1.051 -2.911 0.035** 
16.239 11.120 0.464 0.107 -0.510 0.788 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 11.567 11.057 0.901 -0.397 -4.099 0.046** 
15.243 10.978 0.539 -1.805 -0.843 0.982 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 6.060 4.577 0.925 -2.680 -9.180 0.023** 
7.394 6.539 0.901 -7.993 -2.877 0.231 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 19.089 18.960 0.788 0.957 -2.297 0.299 
20.235 11.076 0.338 -1.683 -2.424 0.758 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 17.246 17.353 0.986 -0.571 -2.096 0.354 
19.422 9.771 0.310 -3.845 -1.806 0.693 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 10.098 8.280 0.988 -3.390 -9.039 0.200 
11.081 3.085 0.407 -10.879 -4.513 0.345 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 14.703 20.673 0.808 -0.646 -3.768 0.419 
31.124 10.380 0.087* 1.351 -1.729 0.272 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 12.333 19.394 0.476 -2.306 -3.191 0.624 
30.552 8.331 0.065* 2.407 -4.244 0.122 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 3.208 9.534 0.398 -4.809 -9.879 0.488 
22.138 0.555 0.077* -4.804 -5.982 0.235 
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Panel A:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO R&D Investment Behavior (Cont.) 
  Options-based Compensation CEO Stock Ownership 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
HIOPT LOWOPT 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HIOPT LOWOPT 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 15.714 8.041 0.118 0.855 -1.683 0.303 15.499 10.000 0.299 0.188 -0.523 0.813 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 14.503 7.091 0.129 -0.844 -2.657 0.367 14.388 9.193 0.324 -1.338 -1.465 0.902 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 9.382 0.584 0.072* -3.137 -5.824 0.374 8.660 3.135 0.302 -4.781 -3.671 0.934 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 26.686 9.303 0.007** 2.575 -2.767 0.106 19.899 20.096 0.979 -0.858 1.904 0.720 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 25.290 7.081 0.004** 0.887 -4.801 0.053* 17.951 18.831 0.904 -1.741 -0.277 0.635 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 18.343 -1.516 0.003** -2.057 -10.826 0.026** 8.970 12.409 0.647 -4.625 -4.957 0.485 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 20.371 12.726 0.261 -0.556 -1.582 0.965 20.128 13.815 0.376 -1.164 -0.556 0.626 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 18.917 9.970 0.188 -1.244 -2.816 0.587 17.937 12.249 0.424 -1.945 -2.338 0.685 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 9.958 0.402 0.177 -4.042 -9.155 0.458 7.758 4.690 0.679 -6.558 -5.456 0.999 
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Panel B:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO Capital Expenditure Investment Behavior 
  OUTSIDER vs. INSIDER FORCED vs. Voluntary 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
Insider Outsider 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Insider Outsider 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
Wilcoxon 
p-value for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 19.358 14.558 0.556 -3.235 -15.801 0.240 5.562 6.650 0.852 -15.812 -4.590 0.001** 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 20.456 15.872 0.562 -1.967 -14.816 0.106 7.318 7.420 0.986 -15.728 -4.623 0.002** 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 18.371 15.078 0.677 0.050 -14.225 0.115 9.472 7.105 0.686 -7.928 -3.783 0.022** 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 15.441 17.848 0.789 -7.466 -15.675 0.820 10.992 6.026 0.619 -21.467 -7.074 0.005** 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 18.622 21.225 0.771 -5.578 -12.857 0.651 15.177 8.624 0.510 -15.588 -8.241 0.011** 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 17.778 22.507 0.600 -3.876 -10.417 0.208 21.286 10.353 0.273 -10.710 -2.094 0.176 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 12.326 20.582 0.528 -13.898 -22.462 0.447 -0.848 2.345 0.710 -26.779 -14.941 0.001** 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 16.729 25.668 0.464 -8.324 -16.641 0.752 6.368 6.874 0.952 -23.823 -8.586 0.002** 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 17.093 28.417 0.355 -5.134 -10.818 0.113 13.968 7.991 0.480 -9.137 -5.369 0.401 
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Panel B: Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO Capital Expenditure Investment Behavior (Cont.) 
  Options-based Compensation CEO Stock Ownership 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
HIOPT LOWOPT 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HIOPT LOWOPT 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 20.549 15.081 0.459 -8.711 -6.064 0.905 21.059 13.948 0.361 -3.264 -11.012 0.007** 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 22.203 15.758 0.357 -5.169 -6.128 0.468 22.483 14.925 0.303 -1.873 -9.091 0.009** 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 21.831 12.935 0.202 -2.499 -7.254 0.079* 20.509 13.384 0.330 0.791 -10.696 0.002** 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 17.590 13.818 0.617 -14.711 -6.493 0.013** 18.838 9.717 0.253 -8.822 -14.219 0.081* 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 22.290 15.498 0.364 -10.133 -5.047 0.198 21.676 13.810 0.322 -3.415 -10.996 0.124 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 23.806 13.543 0.171 -7.543 -5.895 0.948 21.760 13.628 0.306 -1.311 -9.952 0.010** 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 8.234 21.990 0.171 -20.957 -10.756 0.004** 14.647 12.021 0.804 -13.808 -17.860 0.155 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 14.437 24.860 0.277 -13.537 -7.023 0.104 19.620 16.946 0.790 -7.032 -13.934 0.101 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 17.692 23.658 0.532 -6.891 -6.807 0.925 22.028 17.681 0.664 -1.821 -10.847 0.019** 
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Panel C:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO Advertising Investment Behavior 
  OUTSIDER vs. INSIDER FORCED vs. Voluntary 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
Insider Outsider 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Insider Outsider 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
Forced Voluntary 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 29.559 151.798 0.422 -1.650 -11.087 0.001** 263.180 -1.784 0.274 -10.078 -0.920 0.325 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 13.956 7.951 0.669 -3.189 -12.538 0.001** 32.973 -4.319 0.100 -13.235 -4.529 0.260 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 20.543 16.537 0.777 4.856 -3.655 0.002** 46.011 4.429 0.063* 6.268 0.328 0.363 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 30.133 8.383 0.300 -1.093 -9.786 0.027** 27.324 -2.623 0.166 -7.032 0.600 0.641 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 18.739 4.492 0.328 -3.826 -14.079 0.057* 21.668 -7.377 0.186 -12.040 -5.492 0.684 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 29.120 22.900 0.668 5.773 3.971 0.679 41.864 7.373 0.110 12.259 5.743 0.216 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 16.682 18.218 0.928 -3.314 -11.328 0.135 38.029 -3.217 0.175 -2.123 -8.341 0.236 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 12.811 11.015 0.916 -5.489 -15.084 0.119 28.915 -9.926 0.209 -12.074 -14.495 0.466 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 28.429 35.648 0.673 8.257 2.525 0.709 58.456 8.656 0.101 18.217 1.460 0.011** 
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Panel C:  Managerial Incentives Effects on New CEO Advertising Investment Behavior (Cont.) 
  Options-based Compensation CEO Stock Ownership 
Event 
Window 
Percentage 
Change 
Mean Difference Median Difference Mean Difference Median Difference 
  
HIOPT LOWOPT 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HIOPT LOWOPT 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
t-stat p-
value for 
Difference 
HISTK LOWSTK 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
for 
Difference 
(-1, 1) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 115.610 25.613 0.400 -5.239 -4.321 0.745 29.964 121.057 0.419 -5.474 -1.966 0.369 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 15.307 6.545 0.494 -8.374 -4.447 0.230 7.893 17.126 0.494 -9.644 -3.221 0.237 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 26.226 10.227 0.211 2.979 -0.690 0.195 16.126 24.234 0.549 -0.545 2.012 0.756 
(-1, 2) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 18.887 26.489 0.780 -5.221 -2.182 0.465 38.464 11.807 0.331 -0.414 -4.488 0.235 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 13.782 13.096 0.966 -11.610 0.074 0.068* 21.275 8.588 0.456 -3.444 -8.826 0.341 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 33.160 18.957 0.373 7.573 2.327 0.124 35.367 23.453 0.478 7.243 5.503 0.673 
(-1, 3) 
Simple 
percentage 
change 25.558 6.079 0.181 -7.700 -2.666 0.213 13.739 24.607 0.515 -0.490 -6.070 0.537 
Market- 
adjusted 
change 17.755 4.557 0.371 -16.738 6.495 0.023 7.576 19.378 0.485 -5.673 -11.188 0.678 
Industry- 
adjusted 
change 45.282 11.924 0.021** 12.775 0.093 0.072* 29.403 37.797 0.612 8.152 8.257 0.976 
Note: For data definition, please refers to Table 1.  High and low are based on the median of variables option-based compensation and CEO stock ownership.   
* and ** denote the significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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options-based compensation, which supports Hypothesis 8.  On the other hand, CEOs with high stock ownership 
investment more in capital expenditures, which supports Hypothesis 7. 
 
Regressions 
 
We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis following prior research (Bigley and Wiersema, 
2002;  and Huson et al., 2004) and reported the results in Table 4.  Model 1 regresses the firm’s investments on the 
control variables only.  Model 2 includes the interested variables besides the control variables.  The results suggest 
that the explanatory power of the models increases after including the interested variables.  HIOPT has a significant 
positive impact on changes in R&D investment from (-1, 2).  The impact of HIOPT on change in advertising and 
capital expenditures is positive, although insignificant.  This result is consistent with the descriptive statistics, which 
supports Hypothesis 8.  HISTK, on the other hand, is insignificant for all investment types, which does not support 
Hypothesis 7.  FORCED turnover has a positive impact on the firm’s investments, which supports Hypothesis 5, 
although only the effect on changing in advertising from (-1, 2) is statistically significant.  OUTSIDER is 
insignificant in all the regressions, which seems inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.  However, CEO organization tenure 
has a significant lower effect on the firm’s R&D investment, which suggests that CEO with shorter organization 
tenure before becoming CEO significantly changes the firm’s strategy.   Since OUTSIDER is measured as a new  
 
Table 4:  Managerial Incentive Effects on New CEO Change in R&D/Sales, Advertisement/Sales,  
and Capital Expenditure/Sales 
 
ΔR&D/Sales (-1, +2) Δ Advertising/Sales (-1, +2) 
Δ Capital Expenditure/ 
Sales (-1, +2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Industry ΔR&D/sales (-1, +2) 0.2173         
(1.54) 
0.3123*        
(1.85) 
    
Industry Δadvertising /sales (-1, +2)   0.4519***      
(3.07) 
0.3592*        
(1.68) 
  Industry Δcapital expenditure /sales (-
1, +2) 
  
  
0.6104**       
(2.33) 
0.4792***      
(2.77) 
Log asset -4.0944**      
(-2.03) 
-5.2966**      
(-2.25) 
-0.6037        
(-0.23) 
0.3025         
(0.09) 
-7.0311***     
(-3.71) 
-5.4295        
(-1.40) 
Tobin's Q 4.0062         
(0.83) 
1.5011         
(0.34) 
6.5728*        
(1.70) 
6.1478         
(1.09) 
3.9783         
(1.37) 
-0.5356        
(-0.17) 
Free cash flow 29.5254         
(0.56) 
40.1028         
(0.55) 
-56.0945        
(-0.88) 
-148.1404        
(-1.18) 
33.0031         
(0.59) 
135.2805         
(1.25) 
HIOPT 
 
16.2887**       
(2.29) 
 
21.9637         
(0.93) 
 
3.7202         
(0.51) 
HISTK 
 
-6.2840        
(-0.78) 
 
-10.8451        
(-0.63) 
 
-6.5356        
(-0.64) 
FORCED 
 
2.8275         
(0.29) 
 
46.9889*        
(1.72) 
 
0.5903       
(0.07) 
OUTSIDER 
 
-22.5789        
(-1.64) 
 
-46.7755        
(-1.59) 
 
-5.7831        
(-0.38) 
CEO DUALITY 
 
3.6242         
(0.45) 
 
-5.7369        
(-0.36) 
 
7.4595         
(0.96) 
Young CEO 
 
-3.6197        
(-0.44) 
 
23.3268         
(1.22) 
 
18.5295**       
(2.22) 
CEO organization tenure 
 
 
-0.9333**      
(-2.54) 
 
-0.3159        
(-0.37) 
 
-0.3591        
(-0.97) 
CEO cash-based compensation 
 
-2.9167        
(-0.31) 
 
25.2908         
(0.63) 
 
-8.7736        
(-1.07) 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.038 0.0824 0.0613 0.1745 0.0619 0.0846 
Numbers of observations 744 433 345 198 1,403 793 
Note: Model 1 includes the control variables and model 2 includes the addition of the managerial incentive and dismissal effect.  
The models are estimated using clustered standard errors.  The descriptions and sources of data are presented in Table 1.   
t-statistics are in parentheses, * and ** denote the significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.   
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CEO that has worked for the company for one year or less when appointed, CEO organization tenure may reflect a 
better measure for the OUTSIDER construct.  CEO dual leadership is insignificant in the model specifications.  The 
control variables, including industry change in R&D, advertising, and capital expenditures, firm size (log assets), 
and investment opportunity set (Tobin’s Q) are significant.  Consistent with previous research, firm size is 
negatively related to the firm’s investments, and investment opportunity set is positively related to the firm’s 
investments.   
 
In sum, the results suggest that new CEOs with options-based compensation, CEOs following forced 
turnover, and incoming CEOs with shorter organization tenure invest more in investments than the industry average, 
while new CEOs with stock-based compensation, CEOs following voluntary turnover, and incoming CEOs with 
longer origination tenure are more likely to mimic the industrial average.   These results are consistent with the 
managerial incentive effect and the dismissal effect.   
 
Robustness Tests 
 
We examine the robustness of the main results using generalized least squares (GLS) regression that allows 
heteroskedastic and cross-sectional correlation of the errors.  The estimation results are mostly significantly stronger 
than those reported in Table 4, as shown in Table 5.   
 
Table 5:  Robustness Test with GLS Regression 
 
ΔR&D/Sales (-1, +2) Δ Advertising/Sales (-1, +2) 
Δ Capital Expenditure/ 
Sales (-1, +2) 
  
   Industry ΔR&D/sales (-1, +2) 0.5204** 
(19.73) 
  Industry Δadvertising /sales (-1, +2) 
 
0.4802**                      
(12.72) 
 Industry Δcapital expenditure /sales (-1, +2) 
  
0.6853**                                         
(56.54) 
Log asset -4.6021** 
(-14.45) 
-3.0221**                             
(-4.86) 
-5.9850**                                        
(-36.80) 
Tobin's Q 1.9992** 
(4.74) 
3.1221**                       
(7.08) 
-2.6593**                                            
(-11.67) 
Free cash flow 39.0586** 
(10.75) 
-95.9655**                           
(-11.45) 
125.6038**                                             
(32.88) 
HIOPT 16.6329** 
(18.43) 
14.3501**                        
(9.41) 
0.1114                                        
(0.16) 
HISTK -0.2529                            
(-0.26) 
-18.5065**                             
(-9.41) 
-4.6641**                                                
(-8.77) 
FORCED 1.783*                        
(1.71) 
39.7830**                                 
(14.05) 
1.2301**                                     
(2.04) 
OUTSIDER -17.5680**                      
(-13.70) 
-39.1778**                              
(-12.92) 
-1.7865**                                             
(-2.95) 
CEO DUALITY 2.4071** 
(2.53) 
4.8285**                                 
(3.03) 
7.6984**                                            
(13.41) 
Young CEO -3.1345**                   
(-3.78) 
14.7310**                            
(8.68) 
17.8863**                                      
(28.19) 
CEO organization tenure -0.9269**                     
(-21.98) 
-0.1377                                 
(-1.21) 
-0.1761**                                                
(-7.83) 
CEO cash-based compensation -4.2084**                       
(-4.89) 
14.4889**                            
(6.35) 
-7.0035**                                           
(-11.74) 
Wald chi2 5452.75 910.59 81616.2 
Numbers of observations 433 198 793 
Note: The above provides estimation results using generalized least squares (GLS) regression.  The descriptions and sources of 
data are presented in Table 1.  z-statistics are in parentheses, * and ** denote the significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines equity-based compensation of newly appointed CEOs on firms’ future investment 
decisions and whether the relation is affected by the corporate governance provisions and other CEO characteristics.  
The estimation results, in general, support the hypotheses.  The CEO’s weight of options-based compensation is 
found to be an important factor that affects the new CEOs’ investment decisions.  Higher percentage of options-
based compensation of new CEOs leads to higher investment in R&D and advertisement.  In addition, CEOs 
following forced turnover and having less organization tenure have a higher investment in R&D and advertisement 
investment.  The effects of the control variables are generally consistent with the prediction.  For example, the firm 
size is significantly negative in determining R&D and capital expenditure investment, which is consistent with prior 
research.  In addition, the investment opportunity set, Tobin’s Q, is positively related to firms’ investments.   
 
In sum, the current empirical research concludes that equity-based compensation has a significant impact 
on new CEOs’ investment decisions.  Since the model specifications are too simple, future researches can be 
extended in examining additional model specifications and simultaneous models to obtain improved results.   
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